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Abstract
Protecting intellectual property contained in application source code and
preventing tampering with application binaries are both major concerns for software
developers. Simply by possessing an application binary, any user is able to attempt to
reverse engineer valuable information or produce unanticipated execution results through
tampering. As reverse engineering tools become more prevalent, and as the knowledge
required to effectively use those tools decreases, applications come under increased
attack from malicious users.
Emerging development tools such as Microsoft's .NET Application Framework
allow diverse source code composed of multiple programming languages to be integrated
into a single application binary, but the potential for theft of intellectual property
increases due to the metadata-rich construction of compiled .NET binaries. Microsoft's
new Software Licensing and Protection Services (SLPS) application is designed to
mitigate trivial reversing of .NET applications through the use of virtualization. This
research investigates the viability of the SLPS software protection utility Code Protector
as a means of mitigating the inherent vulnerabilities of .NET applications.
The results of the research show that Code Protector does indeed protect compiled
.NET applications from reversing attempts using commonly-available tools. While the
performance of protected applications can suffer if the protections are applied to sections
of the code that are used repeatedly, it is clear that low-use .NET application code can be
protected by Code Protector with little performance impact.
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MITIGATING REVERSING VULNERABILITIES IN .NET APPLICATIONS
USING VIRTUALIZED SOFTWARE PROTECTION

I. Introduction
1.1 Background
The protection of the intellectual property (IP) contained within software
applications has long been a concern of software developers. As reverse engineering
tools and knowledge become more commonplace in the information technology
community, gaining knowledge about an application (either for the purpose of IP theft or
exploiting vulnerabilities in the application) becomes a much simpler process that
requires much less sophistication on the part of the attacker. Therefore, traditional
software protections are quickly being replaced by more advanced protection schemes to
make software reversing more difficult. One such emerging protection scheme is the use
of virtual machines to protect the IP contained within software applications.
To further complicate the protection of intellectual property, many software
developers use new technologies for application development that allow for high
interoperability between software components (even components developed in different
programming languages). One such technology is Microsoft's .NET application
framework. The .NET framework, while very useful in terms of portability and
simplicity, is extremely vulnerable to IP theft because of the large amount of information
contained in .NET binaries.
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To mitigate the vulnerabilities in the .NET framework, Microsoft has recently
developed a protection scheme called Microsoft Software Licensing and Protection
Services (SLPS). This system uses virtualized software protections to secure developerspecified areas of an already created .NET application [16].

1.2 Research Goals
The goal of this research is to examine the protections applied to .NET
applications by SLPS and determine if they successfully mitigate the specific weakness
of .NET applications in the area of intellectual property theft and reverse engineering. To
successfully protect a .NET application, these protections must successfully defend
against attacks from common reversing tools and .NET analysis tools.

1.2.1. Develop Test Application and Apply Software Protection.

To test the

protections applied by the SLPS, a test application is developed using the .NET
application framework. This application contains a reverse engineering target in the form
of an algorithm that will simulate intellectual property contained within a production
.NET application. Once the test application is developed, the SLPS system protects the
simulated IP “target” embedded in the test application.

1.2.2. Perform Red Team Analysis. Once an application is protected with a
specific software protection, reverse engineering techniques and tools are applied to the
application binary to subvert the protections and access the guarded intellectual property
2

that originated from the program source. This research employs a broad spectrum of
reverse engineering and red-teaming techniques to crack the software protections placed
on the test application by the SLPS.

1.2.3 Analyze Attack Results and Application Performance. Finally, this research
determines both the strengths and weaknesses of the virtualized protections in the test
application and the performance impact that these protections have on the application.
The relative strength of the protections is difficult to quantify (especially since its
observation depends on the skill of the reverser), but this research examines the impact of
the virtualized protections on the test application to determine if the protections are
usable in a production software application.

1.3 Document Preview
Chapter 2 examines reverse engineering techniques and tools. Chapter 3 outlines
the experimental methodology used to examine virtualized software protection for .NET
applications. Chapter 4 provides a description and analysis of the experimental results
with specific focus on attacks made against the protection system and information
gathered. Chapter 5 provides a summary of experimental findings as well as future
research in the area of virtualized software protections.
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II. Reverse Engineering and Virtualization Background
2.1 Overview
This chapter describes the most common types of software tools and techniques
in use by software reversers today – debuggers, disassemblers, and decompilers.
Additional consideration is given to a separate class of tools, called deobfuscators, which
are used to specifically defeat virtualization or obfuscation protections. This chapter also
discusses several common software protection schemes and tools used to defeat reverse
engineering tools. Finally, this chapter presents an overview of virtualization as a
technology, specifically as realized in the Microsoft .NET application framework as a
mechanism for software protection; it also discusses the current state of attack
methodologies for defeating virtualized software protections.

2.2 Reverse Engineering Tools and Techniques
2.2.1. Debuggers.

Debugging is the process of viewing the current state of a

program while it is executing, viewing the program data at a given execution state, and
tracing through the program's execution. This process is controlled through the use of a
program called a debugger. For reversers, debuggers are powerful tools that allow them
to observe a program's execution step-by-step to identify critical sections of the reversing
target.
Common techniques used by debugging tools include execution breakpoints and
the ability to trace the control flow of an application. Execution breakpoints allow the
debugger to suspend execution at particular locations of interest in the application
4

instructions. Breakpoints can be set by using INT3 interrupt instructions to replace the
true application instruction at the point where the user wishes to suspend execution and
replacing the breakpoint code with the original instruction once the processor interrupts
and returns control back to the debugger. Some processors also have the ability to
suspend program execution once a certain memory addressed is accessed; these are called
hardware breakpoints, and there are a limited number of these resource available to the
CPU [9].

2.2.2. Disassemblers.

Disassemblers are essentially translators that

convert byte code into human-readable assembly instructions. The process of
interpreting code is a relatively simple parsing problem that maps processor machine
code to specific assembly instructions (e.g., a hex 90 is equal to a NOP instruction for
x86 processors). The complexity in disassembly lies differentiating between code and
data in the program executable [9].
To properly decode x86 instructions, disassemblers typically approach the
problem of interpreting the bytes of an executable using one of three methods. Linear
sweep disassemblers pass through the code to determine instructions based on their
starting opcode and instruction length (byte boundary of the instruction). Recursive
traversal disassemblers use the targets of control branches to identify instructions to be
disassembled and recursively descend through the control structures of a program to
decode the instructions. Finally, dynamic disassemblers assemble the code as the
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program executes, using methods similar to the recursive traversal disassembler in
conjunction with additional tools, such as a debugger [9].

2.2.3. Decompilers.

Decompilers do precisely what their name suggests–

reverse the process of compiling source code to executable code. The goal of a
decompiler is to convert the low-level processor instructions into a disassembled
executable file in a high-level language. However, because high-level instructions do not
necessarily map one-to-one to low-level instructions, decompilers sometimes produce
high-level code that is functionally equivalent to the original but is comprised of a
different set of high-level instructions. This loss of information is due largely to the fact
that most compilers will omit certain information found in high-level code (e.g.,
comments, function names, and constant definitions) for the purpose of optimization [9].
Additionally, the problem of functional equivalence is compounded by the fact that there
are usually multiple ways to approach one problem; the expressions in Figure 2.1
evaluate to the same value but their complexity differs greatly.

(A) ( x + 5 ) / y
(B) [ ( y * x ) * ( 1 / y^2 ) ] + ( 5 / y )

Figure 2.1: Equivalent Expressions of Differing Complexity

If the compiler optimizes the instruction code that is generated, the second
expression may be reduced to look similar (if not identical) to the first. This type of
6

problem also surfaces when equivalent language constructs are used. For example, the
two equivalent Java segments (A) and (B) shown below in Figure 2.2 will have the
same result when interpreted by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), but no information is
included in the low-level code that would allow a decompiler to reconstruct exactly
which version was used in the original high-level code [12].

(A)
{
if ( x < y ) { return true; }
else { return false; }
}
(B)
{
return ( x < y ? true : false );
}

Figure 2.2: Equivalent Code Blocks Performing Identical Tasks

2.2.4. Deobfuscators.

There are a number of tools available to developers

to protect their code through various obfuscation techniques (which is discussed in
Section 2.3.2). Some deobfuscation tools attempt to reverse the transformations that have
been applied to application code to make the code harder to reverse.
Deobfuscators attempt to return obfuscated code to a reduced size executable that
has all unnecessary code removed. Because automated obfuscation tools often introduce
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large amounts of unnecessary complexity to the program code, it is possible in some
cases to use static analysis tools to identify and remove sections of obfuscated code [9].

2.3 Software Protection (Anti-Reversing)
2.3.1. Common Anti-Reversing Techniques. Software developers employ a
number of techniques to prevent reversers from understanding or tampering with their
program code. To defeat code replacement and assembly modifications of the program,
checksums ensure the integrity of certain code sections [4, 9]. Debuggers are also
detected using API calls such as the Win32 isDebuggerPresent() call; typically a program
that detects a debugger in this way will terminate, follow an alternate control path
through the code that generates incorrect output, or possibly attempt to interfere with the
operation of the debugger software. To confuse reversers, it is also possible to remove or
mangle the symbolic information in an executable. This technique makes understanding
the structure and purpose of the application difficult for reversers who are reversing the
code by hand rather than using an automated tool [9].

2.3.2. Obfuscation.

In contrast to the anti-reversing techniques described in

Section 2.3.1, obfuscation is a set of techniques that hides the true functionality of an
application rather than attempting to prevent or detect the use of reversing tools. There
are many ways to make a program more complex (and consequently more difficult to
reverse). Executables can be partially or completely encrypted. This makes reversing
very difficult and can force the reverser to intercept the encryption key or somehow
8

obtain a decrypted form of the program code. The symbolic data stored in the executable
code (e.g., function names) can be removed to confuse the reverser. Additionally, code
can be obfuscated by rearranging the sequence of instructions or how program data is
stored [9]. Program control flow can be obfuscated by several different types of code
transforms as well, both static and dynamic [4, 8].

2.3.3. Automated Protection Tools. There are numerous automated protection
utilities available in the area of software protection. The method of protection varies by
product, but each of these protection schemes delivers powerful software protection that
is easy to use to protect vulnerable applications. Aladdin's HASP HL product uses a
combination of encryption and a hardware key to protect applications and decrypt them at
runtime [1]. ArXan's EnforcIT uses configurable software protections applied to certain
areas of the application code by software developers [3]. Additionally, there are a
number of virtualized software protections, such as VMProtect, WinLicense, and the
recently-released Microsoft Software Licensing and Protection Services (SLPS), that use
virtual machines to obfuscate applications [16, 17, 20]. All of these products are
relatively new to the area of software protection but are largely unverified with respect to
the degree of protection they provide.
2.4 Virtualization
2.4.1. Overview of Virtualization and Virtual Machines.

Virtual machines are

software applications that allow the execution of software in an environment separate
from the host operating environment. Virtual machines are processor-specific due to
9

their reliance on the host environment to provide the CPU and hardware functions
necessary to operate, but the applications that are executed within the virtual machine are
not limited to one execution platform. Applications that are executed by virtual machines
enjoy several benefits that native applications do not have. Because virtual machines
handle architecture-specific details of program execution, applications can run on
multiple computing platforms if there is a suitable virtual machine that can run the
application. This makes virtual machines ideal for resolving application portability
problems. Applications that are executed by a virtual machine also benefit from
additional safety and performance benefits that are not always attainable when an
application is executing directly on the host system [9].
Some virtual machines, such as Microsoft's .NET framework or Sun
Microsystems’ JVM, use a separate instruction encoding scheme from that of the host
architecture. This separate instruction set requires that the virtual machine emulate the
instruction execution or translate the instructions to a form that can be executed by the
host architecture [12, 14].
Current operating system virtualization technology makes use of an intermediary
software application between the host system hardware and the applications running in a
virtual machine. This software is typically called the hypervisor or Virtual Machine
Manager (VMM). The hypervisor provides an interface to the applications running
inside the virtual machine that emulates the underlying hardware for which those
applications were compiled. Hypervisors can manage multiple virtual machines
concurrently, allowing multiple applications or operating systems to run on a single
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system by placing them each within their own virtual machine. When operating from
within a virtual machine, the guest software or operating system has full access to all
resources of the system and the hypervisor manages problems such as scheduling and I/O
device management [6].
Hypervisors may manage virtual machines using emulated virtualization or
paravirtualization. Emulated virtualization fully emulates the guest system's target
architecture in the hypervisor's software. Paravirtualization presents an abstraction of the
underlying hardware to the guest applications. This strategy requires that the guest
software be specially written to cooperate with the hypervisor, but this approach to
virtualization can improve performance over an emulated virtualization environment [6].

2.4.2. Microsoft .NET Application Framework.

One specific virtualization

application is the Microsoft .NET application framework. While the .NET framework is
not a pure virtual machine because its execution is integrated tightly with the underlying
Microsoft operating system (which is the only fully-supported computing platform for
.NET) [14], the runtime application for .NET appears to developers as a virtual machine;
this allows multiple development languages to be written for the .NET Common
Language Runtime (CLR) without considering the specific platform on which the .NET
framework is executing. The .NET application framework contains numerous
development libraries with code solutions that developers can use in their application
development, and .NET abstracts the application development process to a level where
developers need not consider operating system tasks such as memory management [14].
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Applications developed using .NET are converted from their original source
language to an intermediary form, known as the Microsoft Intermediary Language
(MSIL), that is compatible with the Common Language Infrastructure (CLI) which is
Microsoft's standard describing the .NET application code, executing environment, and
rules which comprise the .NET runtime, type system, metadata specifications, and
execution rules [10]. The CLR interprets the CLI-compatible code, which is said to be in
Common Intermediary Language (CIL) form, and executes it on the host system.
According to the Microsoft .NET application framework standard, all implementations of
.NET CLR must also contain a Virtual Execution System (VES) that translates the CIL
instructions into machine language when the program is executed on a .NET host system.
Previous attempts to protect .NET applications have largely been confined to performing
metadata obfuscation or directly obfuscating the MSIL code [19].

Section 2.4.3. Using Virtualization as Software Protection.

Virtualization

and virtual machine instruction sets have traditionally been used as a means to isolate the
operation of applications and remove them from directly executing on the host system.
Virtual machines have recently been used as a means to obfuscate application code [2,
11]. Because the instruction codes of a virtual machine can be different than the
traditional host architecture’s instruction set, it can be challenging to hand-reverse an
application that has been obfuscated in this manner. Additionally, virtualized software
protection can further frustrate reversers’ attacks by changing the translation rules
between virtual machine and host operating system each time the protection is employed,
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meaning that an opcode will not necessarily have a consistent meaning across multiple
protected applications or even throughout the execution of a single application [5, 16,
17].
Virtualization is also suggested to be a suitable means of protecting applications
from reusable reversing attacks. Under normal distribution models, any distributed
binaries of an application that has been successfully reversed are vulnerable to reversing
in a similar manner. Virtualization can therefore introduce diversity into the application
distribution process and generate different versions of the same application binary that
are theoretically not vulnerable to the same attacks [2].

2.5 Attack Methodologies
Virtual software protections can present a difficult challenge to reversers. In
some cases it is possible to subvert the virtual machine mechanism by hooking the virtual
machine's instruction decoding process or calculating where the virtual machine will
execute its next instructions. In cases where direct subversion of the virtual machine is
not possible, reversers can attack the virtual machine through instruction decoding or
through observing the side effects of virtual machine instructions and mapping them to
true x86 assembly code. Even if a virtual machine is not well protected, it still serves to
add an additional layer of obfuscation onto the assembly instructions of an application.
By contrast, a well-protected virtual machine with a great deal of complexity is a true
reversing challenge to defeat [5, 13, 18].
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2.6 Summary
This chapter describes the current state of reverse-engineering tools and
techniques and the protections that are commonly used to thwart reversing efforts.
Additionally, this chapter describes the technology of virtualization and investigates the
potential of virtualization as a software protection mechanism. Although virtualized
software protection is still in its infancy and strategies for defeating virtualized
protections have not been well-investigated or tested, this chapter describes the current
attack methodologies available to reversers to attack virtualized protection systems.

14

III. Experimental Methodology
3.1 Overview
As software reverse engineering tools and knowledge continue to become
increasingly available, code protection techniques have also become more sophisticated
and more commonly employed [9]. Despite these advances in protection, many
organizations have a vested interest in retaining the ability to successfully reverse
engineer and understand the functionality and structure of specialized code that has been
protected or obfuscated. An emerging technology in the area of software protection is
virtualized software protections – software that is protected by transforming the normal
instruction set and wrapping the executable code in a virtual machine that executes the
transformed instructions. Because virtualized software protections are still in their
infancy and formal methods for analyzing virtualized protections are still rudimentary,
reversing code that has been protected in this fashion is often left solely to the skill and
intuition of the individual reverser.
To further complicate matters, virtual machines can protect software by changing
the appearance or structure of the code due to the transformation of the instruction set and
execution of protected instructions within the framework of a virtual machine [9].
Defeating these types of protections often requires extensive amounts of time and effort
and can be extremely tedious to perform. While common reverse engineering tools, such
as IDAPro or OllyDbg, give reversers a great deal of insight into the nature of most
program code, virtualized protections often limit the usefulness of these tools as avenues
to attack or reverse a piece of code. Because of this limitation in current reversing
15

technologies, a tool or process that analyzes a virtual code protection scheme and assists
reversers in planning their attacks on such programs would be highly beneficial.
Alternatively, such a tool could also be used by software engineers to evaluate the
relative strengths and weaknesses of a virtualized protection scheme.

3.2 Problem Definition
3.2.1 Goals and Hypothesis. The purpose of this research effort is to develop a
means to evaluate the effectiveness of a virtual software protection scheme. This
methodology can aid reversers in attacking or understanding virtualized code and assist
software engineers in understanding the relative strengths and weaknesses of virtualized
software protections they have applied to their code. Virtualized code is difficult for both
software tools and human beings to understand, so it would be advantageous if the
application of formal protection analysis could be used to determine the effectiveness of a
virtual protection or remove some of the obfuscation from a piece of code.
To better understand program code that is protected by virtual software
protections, the analysis strategy created as a result of this research effort must attempt to
show either that the application's protections can be subverted or that they cannot. While
this determination is restricted to include only examinations made based on the skill and
experience of the individual reverser, it can be repeated by different classes of reversing
adversaries. This research therefore develops analysis methodologies to successfully
evaluate the level of protection provided by obfuscated code and therefore increase the
understanding of that code.
16

3.2.2 Approach.

To better enable reversers to effectively evaluate protected

code, it is necessary to understand the nature of virtual protection. Using detailed
knowledge of virtualized obfuscation techniques, an established virtualization protection
system called the Microsoft Software Licensing and Protection System (SLPS) is used to
apply protections to test applications. These applications are evaluated by common
reversing tools and techniques to determine the strengths of their protection schemes. By
attempting to subvert the applied protection scheme and analyzing the degree of
protection it provides, the test methodology is able to produce a determination of the
effectiveness of a protection scheme in preventing the researcher’s reversing efforts. The
SLPS is selected as the protection system for this research effort due to its claim of
satisfying Anckaert's requirement of “diversity” to prevent attack replication [2] and its
claim to secure .NET applications [16].

3.3 System Boundaries
Because the effectiveness of a protection scheme is being tested, the system under
test (SUT) is a software reversing system. The system includes computer hardware and
an operating system to serve as a platform for testing, a set of disassembler/debugger
tools for use in evaluating the software to be reversed, an attack methodology for
attempting to reverse virtual code protections, and a set of protected application code for
use in software protection. The set of tools is composed of OllyDbg, IDAPro, and .NET
Reflector and its plugins.
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The protected test application code of the software reversing system is the focus
of this research effort and is the component under test (CUT). This research evaluates the
specified protection as applied to the CUT and attempts determine the effectiveness of
the protection scheme, so the SUT will provide a framework on which to build an
evaluation of the CUT as a viable protection analysis tool. The block diagram for the
SUT and CUT is shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Software Reversing System

3.4 System Services
The software reversing system takes a protected program executable and attempts
to remove or subvert the virtualized software protections to the greatest extent possible so
18

that a reverser can evaluate the relative strength of the virtualized protection scheme used
to apply those protections. This process may not result in a perfectly decoded set of
instructions, so the result may be a partially-protected executable or an executable which
could not be reversed to any degree and is thus still protected (meaning that the attack
methodology of the system has failed to reverse the software).
Obviously there is a large degree of human interaction with the SUT to produce
the system service, and that imperfect (and many times inconsistent) interaction with the
other components is one of the motivations for defining a formal attack methodology.
The intent of the system is to successfully defeat the protections provided by the virtual
machine through the use of a reversing methodology and therefore generate a positive
system result from the specific protection being tested. Specifically, the CUT is a set of
protected instructions as the system response; the defined metrics measure the number of
instructions that are decoded correctly versus incorrectly (when compared with the
unprotected workload executable’s instructions), the time required to decode these
instructions, and the number of attempts required to search the instruction set space.
The CUT is a particular test application called “FractalAttack” written for the
purpose of simulating a scientific application with algorithms containing some IP
protected by SLPS. This application is written in C# and is compiled as a .NET
application binary. The application is centered around the generation and display of
Heighway-Dragon (HD) fractals. HD fractals are a series of line segments that are
calculated based on the existing segments in the fractal. The test application uses HD
fractals because it is a simple matter to implement an HD fractal generator and because
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HD fractal generation and display is computationally intensive at high degrees. The
fractal can be iteratively constructed as a series of left or right turns using the algorithm
described in Figure 3.2.

Heighway-Dragon Fractal Calculation
Fractal of degree i (positive integer)
Assume the base value of “sequence” is empty
Let: sequence' denote the inversion of sequence
(e.g. R switches to L, L switches to R)
for each i
let sequence = sequence + “R” + sequence'
Example: first 4 iterations of an HD fractal
D1: R
D2: RRL
D3: RRLRLLR
D4: RRLRLLRRLLRLRRL

Figure 3.2: Heighway-Dragon Fractal Calculation Algorithm

When represented graphically, the HD fractal forms a fractal curve whose number
of line segments increases geometrically for each successive degree. The fractal can be
described solely by the fractal degree and the starting orientation of the first line segment,
after which all successive turns and new line segments may be calculated using the
algorithm in Figure 3.2.
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3.5 Workload
The workload for the software reversing system is the virtual protection scheme
that is obfuscating the executable, the set of parameters to specify the configuration of the
virtualized protection, and the virtual machine that executes the protected application
code. The protection scheme will include a set of instructions that map to normal x86 or
CIL execution instructions and an execution command string that specifies input
parameters. This greatly narrows the research scope to attack methodologies for a
specific protection type but limits the usefulness of the finalized methodology in that it
may only apply to the SLPS protection system.
Because the protection scheme of the executable is virtualized and because the
protection will be applied in the same way to any application given as input, a single
unprotected set of executable instructions can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the
software reversing system. The protection scheme will not behave differently with
different sets of unprotected code [15, 16]. This allows attacks against the virtual
protection to be quickly tested and evaluated for performance since the executable
remains constant. The specific techniques that are used in attempting to defeat the virtual
protections are a combination of brute-force attacking, control flow analysis, instruction
set mapping, automated deobfuscation, and instruction observation at the operating
system level [5, 13]. These techniques are commonly employed in attempts to reverse
engineer software protection systems [9].

21

3.6 Performance Metrics
The primary metrics for evaluating the effectiveness of a virtual protection are the
number of program instructions that the reversing methodology can correctly identify and
the time required for the analysis to succeed or fail. These metrics measure in some
sense the effectiveness of the attack methodology. A more effective attack strategy
should generate an executable with a greater number of unprotected instructions and a
faster break time than will an ad hoc attack strategy.
The time that the attack methodology requires is of some interest because it
identifies a particularly difficult protection to defeat. The time metric is not necessarily
valid in every situation because of the complex randomized nature of certain virtual
protections and because the time to defeat a protection will be largely dependent on the
talent of the human reverser. However, it gives an indication of the relative difficulty of
defeating a given protection.
The number of instructions that are correctly identified is also of interest to the
evaluation of a virtual protection because it indicates how well the virtual machine is able
to disguise its protected application. While it may be possible to decode single
instructions because of irregularities in the protection scheme or just by pure luck,
decoding large percentages of the code not only indicates that the attack methodology
was able to bypass the protection on the executable, but it also indicates just how broad
of an area of the executable was revealed by the reversing attempts targeted against the
virtual machine.
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3.7 Parameters
3.7.1 System. The system parameters for the reversing system include the
computer hardware, operating system, unprotected executable code, and compiler of the
platform being used to reverse an executable. The computer hardware consists of a Dell
Precision 650 workstation with dual Xeon 2.4 GHz processors and 2GB of RAM running
Microsoft Windows XP Profession SP 2 as the operating system. These parameters are
fixed due to the decision to consider only reversing Windows executables, and the
hardware follows as a parameter due to the use of the AT-SPI/AFIT computers as the test
platforms. The hardware should not affect the virtual machine instruction set decoding
metrics because of the operating system’s provision of a layer of abstraction when
interacting with the hardware devices. The time metric could potentially be affected if
the test is conducted on a different system. The compiler is a Microsoft Visual Studio
2005 C# compiler version 8.0.50727.762.

3.7.2 Workload.

The workload parameters for the software reversing system

are the virtual protection scheme that is used by SLPS to protect an executable, the
configuration parameters of the SLPS protection system, and the specific generated
virtual machine that is used to protect and execute the instructions. The complexity of
the virtual machine and the virtual protection scheme is determined largely by the way
the executable is protected by the SLPS, although human interaction with the protection
system determines which parts of the unprotected application should be secured. In this
case, the experiment has one specific lightweight virtual machine, one protection scheme
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determined by the SLPS, and only one significant configuration for the SLPS
configuration parameters.

3.8 Evaluation Technique
Only a few commercial virtual protection options are available for use as
protection tools [2, 6]. These protection systems are proprietary, and thus the instruction
sets and information about the complexity of the protections are not readily available,
although it may be possible to reverse engineering this information through careful
observation of the virtual machines’ execution. Because this experimental setup
evaluates the strength of a software protection, the type and complexity of the virtual
protection is a constant factor since the same protection scheme is used regardless of the
specific application code protected.
The experimental configuration consists of an unprotected executable that is
generated from the combination of the Visual Studio C# compiler, the SLPS protection
system and generated code protected by virtualization, one or more computer systems on
which to install the experimental setup, and set of reversing tools and strategies for use in
analyzing the protections. The reverser will analyze and attack the executable protected
with the virtual protection being tested. After the reverser has completed or failed the
attack, the executable is analyzed to measure experiment metrics.
The results can easily be validated by comparing the decoded instructions
generated from the reversing tool to the actual unprotected instructions that were
generated by the compiler. In this way, it is easy to determine whether an attack
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methodology was successfully able to decode the instruction set and therefore understand
the protected code. An instruction is considered successfully reversed if it is decoded and
represented identically to its original unprotected form or represented in a functionally
equivalent form that demonstrates understanding of the underlying algorithms used to
create the original code.

3.9 Experimental Design
A single-test experimental configuration is appropriate for this experiment, with
the sole combination of virtual machine and protection scheme (realized in an individual
protected executable that is based on the single unprotected executable) being the only
protected executable tested. Because reverse-engineering can be time consuming and
tedious, it is often a pass/fail result depending on whether or not the protection scheme
was able to be bypassed. Further, because the protection scheme can be determined to be
vulnerable by a single successful break of the protections, this experimental design does
not require more than a single pass/fail experiment to determine metrics for a specific
protection scheme. The researcher is the sole reverser for the purposes of this research,
but additional reversers would provide more descriptive bounds for the time metrics. The
protected executable must be extensively attacked to have any confidence about the
effectiveness of the protection guarding it. It is for this reason the experiments focus on
the results of attacking a specific section of the executable to obtain data that is as
accurate as possible.
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3.10 Methodology Summary
In evaluating virtualized software protections, it is necessary to perform testing of
the software reversing system and a specific configuration of the SLPS and its virtual
machine to validate the strength of the protections applied to the code. The system under
test is the entire software reversing system (composed of the protected application code,
human reverser, attack methodology, and reversing tools) and the component under test is
protected application code realized in the form of a test executable that has been secured
using virtualized protections. System parameters include the operating system, the
compiler used to create program executables, the protection system (SLPS in this
experiment), and the basic computer hardware on which the operating system is running
and the SUT will be evaluated. The workload parameters are the virtual protection
scheme employed by the protection system, the generated virtual machine that executes
the protected code, and the configuration parameters used to generate the protected
executable; all of which will affect the test framework’s ability to successfully attack the
protected application. The experiment is conducted by using any and all means available
to attack the protected executable and attempt to successfully extract any useful
information about the secure virtual machine, its execution, or the protected application.
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IV. Analysis and Results
4.1 Overview
This chapter describes the experimental results of this research. Statistical
techniques are used to analyze the performance data from the test application, and to
draw conclusions about the data that is presented. For the qualitative analysis of the
software protections applied to the target application, simulated IP “objectives” are
protected using SLPS and several commonly-available reversing tools are used to attack
the protected binary and attempt to attack the tampering and reversing objectives.

4.2 Qualitative Analysis of Reversing Efforts
4.2.1. Reversing Test Goals. Code Protector, a part of the Microsoft Software
Licensing and Protection System (SLPS), is used to protect FractalAttack, a C#
application compiled for the Microsoft .NET application framework. FractalAttack is
developed specifically to evaluate the ability of Code Protector to secure .NET
applications. It performs a computationally intense task (iteratively generating a fractal
image in bitmap form) and use multi-threading to display progress updates during the
rendering process. These aspects of the application make it an ideal candidate to simulate
a real-world scientific computing application.
The protection goal is to secure FractalAttack with the maximal set of Code
Protector’s software protection capabilities. The strength of these protections is tested
using commonly-available reversing tools, several of which are specifically for reversing
.NET applications.
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The protections applied to the executable by SLPS are targeted to two specific
program methods within the FractalAttack application. First, a single method that
contains a hard-coded numeric limitation on the maximum number of iterations of the
fractal generation algorithm is protected. This method tests the effectiveness of Code
Protector against reverse engineering and tampering objectives. Second, the critical
algorithms of FractalAttack that actually calculate the starting orientation of the fractal
curve are protected to simulate a scientific computing IP protection scenario.

4.2.2. Protection Tool.

Code Protector is a virtual machine-based software

protection developed as a part of SLPS, Microsoft’s newly-released license management
and software protection solution for .NET applications. The goal of Code Protector is to
prevent .NET applications from being disassembled/decompiled. This is challenging
since the Common Language Runtime (CLR) environment that executes .NET
applications uses an intermediate language from which it is possible to extract a great
deal of metadata thereby allowing accurate reconstruction of the original source code.
Code Protector attempts to mitigate the openness of the .NET application source by
transforming code in Microsoft’s Secure Virtual Machine Language (SVML) and then
executing the protected code using the Microsoft Secure Virtual Machine (SVM)
operating on the CLR platform. Code Protector uses a permutation transform system so
each customer to receive a unique version of the SVML. This theoretically makes Code
Protector’s software protections more secure. If one version of the SVML is
compromised, the others are unaffected due to differences between versions [16].
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Although the Code Protector software requires .NET 3.0 to execute properly, the
documentation and configuration options indicate that target executables must be .NET
binaries or DLLs using version 1.1.4322 or 2.0.50727 of the .NET framework.
Additionally, three DLLs are created during the protection process. These DLLs must be
present in the same directory for the protected application to execute properly. The DLLs
are bundled with the test application and are listed below:

•

Microsoft.Licensing.Runtime2.0.dll

•

Microsoft.Licensing.Utils2.0.dll

•

Microsoft.Licensing.Permutation_1cc06_2.0.dll

Note that the “1cc06” piece of the permutation reflects the key value of the
specific permutation that was used to protect the application (this is observed to be the
first five digits of the permutation code, although this DLL naming convention is not
documented anywhere in Microsoft’s literature).
Code Protector also imposes a number of restrictions on which language
constructs can be used in the source code of a protected application. These constructs are
disallowed:

•

Methods within generic classes

•

Pure 64-bit executable code
(code must be x86 flagged or use Windows on Windows3)
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•

Methods containing explicit instantiations of generic types

•

Methods with generic parameters

•

Non-static methods of a structure

•

Methods with “out” or “ref” parameters

•

Methods that invoke other methods with “out” or “ref” parameters (C#
reference passing or output parameters)

•

Methods that modify any method parameter by reference

•

Methods with a variable number of parameters (e.g., using the
“params” keyword in C#)

•

Methods with too many local variables or parameters (> 254).

•

Methods that contain calls to
Reflection.Assembly.GetExecutingAssembly(),
Reflection.MethodInfo.GetCurrentMethod(), or
Reflection.Assembly.GetCallingAssembly().

•

CLR 1.1 Framework only: Methods that create objects using
constructors that have a variable number of parameters. This
restriction does not exist when a non-constructor method is invoked.

•

Implicit and explicit cast operators cannot be transformed to the
Secure Virtual Machine (SVM)

•

Unsafe code – For example, in C#, methods that contain the keyword
unsafe typically cannot be transformed [15].
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If Code Protector detects any of the above constructs in the application being
protected, the application is not fully protected. In this case, a warning is given to the
user indicating both the reason for failure and the offending function that violated one of
the above conditions.

4.2.3. Test Application.

FractalAttack is designed to allow easy generation

of fractals by users. FractalAttack uses a Windows Form (a .NET GUI object). The
primary GUI window is the central control structure, with several buttons, drop-down
boxes, and text fields that control the options that control the fractal generation process.
The actual calculation of the fractal is done by iteratively constructing the fractal, then
performing the graphical rendering of the fractal to a displayable image. The fractal
generation process first calculates the fractal in a string representation (using a sequence
of line turns to specify the fractal) then generates the fractal in two-dimensional array
space, and finally renders the fractal by converting it to an appropriately scaled bitmap
image.
FractalAttack is compiled as a single executable file. The entire program was
written in the C# programming language so that it is composed entirely of .NET code.
The application is dependent on several libraries that are present in the .NET framework
(e.g. Windows Forms and Bitmap image handling).

4.2.4. Test Application Protection.

Some of the more complex functions in

FractalAttack are modified to support Code Protector’s requirements (e.g. “ref”
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parameters had to be replaced with by-value passing) for the IP protection test. The
modified methods are the orientation calculation and input validation.
While Code Protector does appear to have several configurable options for
protecting applications, the interaction between the various options causes all but a few of
the configurations to be largely ineffective. Aside from normal configuration options,
such as the .NET version of the executable, Code Protector has four specific protection
options which can each be set to either “True” or “False.” These options are Cloak
Method Calls, Cross-Assembly Calls Cloaking, Drop Metadata, and Enable Code
Transformation. Cloak Method Calls and Cross-Assembly Calls Cloaking prevent
viewing of calls between protected methods within the same binary and calls between
protected methods in other binaries, respectively. Drop Metadata is supposed to prevent
the easy reconstruction of symbolic information in the original source code by removing
that data from the CLR stack. All tests performed by the researcher revealed that there
was always some metadata, such as the function names or the number and type of input
parameters, visible even after applying this protection. Finally, Enable Code
Transformation is required for Code Protector to edit the application binary and add calls
to the SVM, so this choice is necessary for maximum protection. Through experience, it
was found that maximum protection can only be achieved by setting each option in Code
Protector to “True.” As such, this practice was used throughout the protection tests [15].

4.2.5. Attack Analysis.

All attempts to break into the SVM and completely

remove the obfuscation from the protected methods to observe or modify application
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execution were unsuccessful. Attacks on the protected application are therefore limited
to using commonly-available reversing tools to attempt to gain as much information from
the protected application as possible. After repeated attempts to break the application's
protections, there seem to be no viable attack methods using the available reversing tools.
Thus, breaking the protections that are applied to the test application is beyond the scope
of this research.
.NET Reflector and OllyDbg are the most helpful tools in determining what
occurs in the methods protected by code protector. While the method names, arguments
and types, and direct SVM calls are visible, direct manipulation of the input data values
for the purpose of tampering with the values contained in the protected executable is only
possible by editing the calling method’s string before it is passed to the protected method.
Using a combination of the .NET Reflector debugger plugin “Deblector” (a
combination of “Debugger” and “Reflector”) and OllyDbg to view the protected
application as it executes, the calls to the SVM in the generated DLLs are visible only on
a sporadic basis. Possibly due to some unknown anti-debugging measure or possibly due
to the multi-threaded nature of the application, debugging the executable makes it
unstable and typically causes program failure.
4.3 Quantitative Analysis of Performance Impacts
4.3.1. Static Analysis of Protected Binaries. The protection does not appear to
significantly alter the target application’s performance, although protecting a more
computationally-intensive method results in significant performance decreases for the
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protected application (in fact, Microsoft’s documentation suggests that frequently-used
methods are poor candidates for protection due to performance issues).
The executable size difference between the protected and unprotected application
binary is negligible because Code Protector simply replaces the protected functions’
instructions with calls to the SVM and setup information. Both the looping and singleuse orientation method versions of the protected application are approximately 36KB,
while both versions of the unprotected application are approximately 32KB.
These observations, along with analysis of the protected application source,
suggest that the protection system strips the functionality out of methods that are marked
for protection and replaces them with calls to the protected Microsoft Secure Virtual
Machine (SVM). Analysis of the protected application binary using .NET Reflector
confirms this hypothesis in Section 4.2 above.

4.3.2. Dynamic Analysis of Protected Binaries.

There is no human-

observable impact on runtime length or responsiveness between the protected and
unprotected versions of the target application. Therefore, the test application uses the
difference between the system time immediately upon the entry into the
displayHeighwayDragon method (displayed below in Appendix A) and the system time
immediately before the return from the same method to determine the execution length of
that method in milliseconds. Metrics gathered from comparisons of the protected
application versus the unprotected application are described below.
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Testing of application runtimes is divided into four categories: the unprotected
test application runtimes; the protected test application runtimes; the unprotected test
application with orientation calculations at each new line decision iteration; and the
protected test application with orientation calculations at each line decision iteration. The
first two categories are runtimes from the protected and unprotected versions of the test
application with SLPS protections applied only to a single method (the orientation
computation method, which is called only once during fractal generation). The third and
fourth categories are runtimes from the protected and unprotected versions of the test
application with SLPS protections applied to a modified computeOrientation method that
is invoked at each line turn decision in the fractal computation (8191 calls for the degree
12 fractal used in testing). Thirty (30) runtime values (in milliseconds) are recorded for
each of the four versions of the test application. Each runtime is recorded from a fresh
restart of the test application and is measured from a calculation and display of a
Heighway-Dragon fractal of degree 12 oriented at pi/2.
Descriptive statistics and histogram plots for the runtime metrics for the singlefunction protected versus unprotected applications are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The
unprotected application shows consistently faster runtimes, and the 2-sample t-test shown
in Figure 4.3 indicates that the difference between the two means is statistically
significant due to a p-value of less than 0.001.
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Figure 4.1. Statistics and Histogram for Protected Application Runtimes

The observed dynamic behavior of the unprotected and protected executables
suggests that protected single-use functions do not significantly affect the performance of
the application. While the two sample means are statistically different, the protected
application mean is 885.9 ms slower than the unprotected application mean. This 34.1%
increase in speed is tolerable if the protected application provides protection of the
application’s intellectual property.
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Figure 4.2. Statistics and Histogram for Unprotected Application Runtimes

Two-Sample T-Test and CI: Unprotected, Protected
Two-sample T for Unprotected vs Protected
N
Mean StDev SE Mean
Unprotected 30 2599.5
45.0
Protected
30 3485.4
76.1

8.2
14

Difference = mu (Unprotected) - mu (Protected)
Estimate for difference: -885.9
95% CI for difference: (-918.4, -853.4)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -54.86
P-Value = 0.000

DF = 47

Figure 4.3. MINITAB Output for 2-Sample T-Test of Unprotected versus Protected
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Figure 4.4. Statistics and Histograms for Protected Looping Application Runtimes

However, if a new computeOrientation method is applied within the main fractal
generation loop (specifically to the line orientation calculation method
calculateNextHeighwayDragonLine, visible in Appendix A), a protected version of the
application is significantly slower than the unprotected application. This is indicated by
the difference between the sample means as shown by a 2-sample t-test with a p-value of
less than 0.001. Descriptive statistics and histogram plots for the runtime metrics for the
single-function protected versus unprotected applications are shown in Figures 4.4 and
4.5. The MINITAB data is shown below in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.5. Statistics and Histograms for Unprotected Looping Application Runtimes

Two-Sample T-Test and CI: Unprotected Looping, Protected Looping
Two-sample T for Unprotected Looping vs Protected Looping

Unprotected Looping
Protected Looping

N
30
30

Mean
2588.1
9003.1

StDev
49.9
70.3

SE Mean
9.1
13

Difference = mu (Unprotected Looping) - mu (Protected Looping)
Estimate for difference: -6415.0
95% CI for difference: (-6446.6, -6383.4)
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -407.54
P-Value = 0.000 DF = 52

Figure 4.6. MINITAB Output for 2-Sample T-Test of Looping Applications
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Because the two sample means for the looping test applications are statistically
different, the large magnitude of the difference between the protected and unprotected
runtime means indicates a significant slowdown (6415 ms) when the SLPS protections
are applied to a high-use program method. The unprotected looping application executes
in only 28.75% of the time required for the protected looping application to execute. The
protected application experiences slightly higher system memory usage than the
unprotected application, and this fact is attributed to the extra DLLs that are loaded and
called in order for the application to utilize the SVM. Usage of the protected application
is identical to the unprotected application, so long as the .NET framework is installed on
the system and the DLLs that are created by Code Protector are included with the
application.

4.4 Summary of Results and Analysis
Code Protector is a viable solution to mitigate the inherent openness of .NET
applications’ source. Because the protected application must still run atop the CLR, the
executed instructions are still visible at some level, despite the obfuscation protecting
them. However, commonly-available reversing tools are not sufficient to defeat the
protections applied to the target application by Code Protector for the purpose of reverse
engineering protected algorithms or tampering with program data.
Microsoft warns that Code Protector should not be used to secure methods that
are frequently used or that take up a large amount of processing time due to the
performance impact. While the first test application used for this evaluation was not
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affected by this problem, it is problematic if the IP of an application resides in a method
that is invoked frequently or consumes a great deal of processing time. This performance
slowdown is confirmed by a modified test application which contains repeated calls to
the protected methods when compared to the performance of an application that only
calls the protected method once.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Overview
This chapter presents an overview of the conclusions of this research and the
results of each of this research's goals. This chapter also describes new areas of research
and research that can be directly extended from this current effort.

5.2 Summary of Research Goals
5.2.1. Develop Test Application and Apply Software Protection.

This research

presents a test .NET application that has selected methods protected using the software
protection scheme being tested. The application consists of a multi-threaded interface
and contains scientific calculations suitable for simulating intellectual property that is in
need of protection from tampering or reverse engineering. The interface is simple and
easy to use, and it produces graphical feedback to indicate successful completion.
SLPS is used to apply protections to this application in a logical configuration to
two different methods within the application. A simulated tampering objective is present
within the first protected method and a decision algorithm is present within the second
method. These protected methods are the targets for the red team analysis portion of this
research.

5.2.2. Perform “Red Team” Analysis.

The protections applied to the test

application are evaluated using commonly-available reversing tools. The protections
were effective in preventing tampering and reverse engineering efforts by the researcher
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using OllyDbg, IDAPro, and .NET Reflector. Debugging the protected executable is
complicated by the multi-threaded nature of the test application, but any observation of
the visible execution of the SVM itself does not yield successful results in reversing the
protected algorithm. While it is possible to tamper with the input parameters to the
methods which contain the tamper and reversing targets, no tampering with the method
itself is possible.

5.2.3. Analyze Attack Results and Application Performance.

No effective

tampering or reverse engineering attacks were conducted against the protections applied
to the test application, although the structure of the Microsoft SVM and SLPS protection
libraries is visible through careful examination of the method calls and DLLs generated
by Code Protector. The multi-threaded nature of the application makes analysis difficult,
but even when the protected application was debugged using its originating development
environment, no useful observation of the SVM's operations occurred.
Microsoft cautions developers against using its protection methods on methods
that are repeatedly called or consume large amounts of the application's overall execution
time [15, 16]. This claim was verified through comparison of repeated calls to a
protected method versus an identical unprotected method within the test application.
However, as demonstrated by the orientation decision method of the protected test
application, single-use methods do not significantly impact the performance of protected
applications versus identical unprotected applications.
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5.3 Future Research
Virtualization is a well established technology in computing, but the use of
virtualization as a software protection is a relatively new idea that has not been widely
examined in scholarly literature. A valuable research effort could be to formalize the
definition of virtualized software protections and analyze the inherent vulnerabilities
present in that class of software protections. Additionally, formal methods for creating
virtual protections would be of great value to developers investigating the creation of a
software protection application.
While this research was unsuccessful in subverting the protections applied by the
SLPS to the test application, further efforts could be made to attack the virtual protection
scheme offered by Code Protector using automated tools or different reversing methods.
More generally, other virtual software protections could be attacked and analyzed in a
similar manner to identify other viable virtualized protections or potentially vulnerable
protection schemes.
As with most topics in the realm of software protection, it is difficult to define
metrics that accurately capture the degree of protection offered by a specific form of
software protection. This research defines performance metrics as a means of evaluating
the suitability of an application for protection by Code Protector, but other metrics would
be useful in evaluating the effectiveness of individual protections or classes of software
protections.
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5.4. Summary
This research demonstrates that the protections applied to .NET application code
by the Microsoft SLPS are an effective means of mitigating the inherent openness of
.NET application binaries. While there are some prohibitive restrictions as to what types
of .NET libraries and language constructs may be used in applications which are
protected by SLPS, the test application is able to work around these limitations in order to
conform to the constraints and ensure correct protection of the application. Application
performance is a concern with the SLPS in cases where protected methods are repeatedly
invoked or consume a great deal of the application's overall processing time as there is
considerable overhead involved with executing a method within the SVM.
Code Protector is certainly a useful tool for protecting applications against
reversers having moderate reversing experience/skill. While it seems plausible that
automated tools or skilled adversaries could defeat the virtualized protections of the
SLPS, it is a difficult and tedious undertaking to attack the application “by hand” using
only commonly-available reversing tools. This makes Code Protector a viable way to
secure intellectual property within certain .NET applications against tampering and
reversing.
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Appendix A. Complete Test Application Source Code
Program.cs (top level main file)
//all code written by Matthew Zimmerman
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Windows.Forms;
//top level class to control program start
namespace FractalAttackGUI {
static class Program {
/// <summary>
/// The main entry point for the application.
/// </summary>
[STAThread]
static void Main() {
Application.EnableVisualStyles();
Application.SetCompatibleTextRenderingDefault(false);
Application.Run(new FractalAattackGUII());
}
}
}

FractalAttackGUI.cs (GUI frame and main generation methods)
//all code written by Matthew Zimmerman
using
using
using
using
using
using
using

System;
System.Collections.Generic;
System.ComponentModel;
System.Data;
System.Drawing;
System.Text;
System.Windows.Forms;

namespace FractalAttackGUI {
public class FractalAattackGUII : Form {
//class constants
public const String VERSION = "1.0";
public const int GUI_MAX_ITERATIONS_CENTERED = 10;
//selection codes
public const int INVALID = 0;
public const int HEIGHWAY_DRAGON = 1;
public const int EXIT = 2;
//display methods
public const int CONSOLE = 1;
public const int FLAT_FILE = 2;
public const int BITMAP_FILE = 3;
//ASCII text constants
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public
public
public
public
public
public

const
const
const
const
const
const

int SPACE = 0;
int V_LINE = 1;
int H_LINE = 2;
char VERTICAL_LINE = '|';
char HORIZONTAL_LINE = '_';
char WHITESPACE = ' ';

//sequence information
public const char RIGHT = 'R';
public const char LEFT = 'L';
//orientation constants
public const int NORTH = 1;
public const int SOUTH = 2;
public const int EAST = 3;
public const int WEST = 4;
//fractal generation constants
public const int CALCULATE_FOLDS = 1;
public const int GENERATE_BITMAP = 2;
public const int RENDER_FRACTAL = 3;
//HD console
public const
public const
public const

display limitations
int HEIGHWAY_DRAGON_CONSOLE_LIMIT = 10;
int HEIGHWAY_DRAGON_LARGE_WARNING = 16;
int HEIGHWAY_DRAGON_HUGE_WARNING = 30;

//HD output file options
public const string CURRENT_DIRECTORY = "./";
public const string FLAT_FILE_NAME = "HD_FF_";
public const string FLAT_FILE_EXTENSION = ".dat";
public const string BITMAP_NAME = "HD_PIC_";
public const string BITMAP_EXTENSION = ".bmp";
//bitmap display
public const int
public const int
public const int

array values
EMPTY_SPACE = 0;
LINE = 1;
GRADIENT = 2;

//bitmap drawing
public const int
public const int
public const int

values
VERTICAL = 0;
HORIZONTAL = 1;
CORNER = 2;

//UI preferences
public const int SCALING = 3;
public const int WAIT_TIME = 2000;
//GUI components
ComboBox fractalChooser;
Panel optionsPanel;
Label optionsLabel;
Label typeLabel;
Label orientationLabel;
Label iterationsLabel;
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Label progressBarLabel;
Button generateFractalButton;
TextBox iterations;
ComboBox orientationChooser;
Panel displayPanel;
MainMenu menu;
MenuItem fileMenu;
MenuItem fileSaveFractal;
MenuItem fileExitProgram;
MenuItem aboutMenu;
MenuItem aboutHelpMenuItem;
MenuItem aboutInformationMenuItem;
StatusBar status;
StatusBarPanel messages;
ContinuousProgressBar progressDisplay;
BackgroundWorker threadedGeneration;
//threading shared variables
static bool fractalGenerated;
static bool generationInProgress;
static int fractal_stage;
static int fractal_progress;
static int fractal_orientation;
static long fractal_iterations;
static int fractal_type;
static Bitmap fractal_picture;
//top-level initialization control
public FractalAattackGUII() {
InitializeGUIComponents();
displayMessage("Welcome to Fractal Attack!");
//set Booleans for threaded generation
fractalGenerated = false;
generationInProgress = false;
fractal_progress = 0;
fractal_stage = CALCULATE_FOLDS;
}
//setup GUI objects for the primary application window
private void InitializeGUIComponents() {
this.SuspendLayout();
this.AutoScaleDimensions = new System.Drawing.SizeF(8F, 16F);
this.AutoScaleMode = System.Windows.Forms.AutoScaleMode.Font;
this.AutoSize = true;
this.ClientSize = new System.Drawing.Size(550, 475);
this.MaximumSize = new System.Drawing.Size(550, 475);
this.MinimumSize = new System.Drawing.Size(550, 475);
this.StartPosition = FormStartPosition.CenterScreen;
this.Margin = new System.Windows.Forms.Padding(4);
this.Font = new System.Drawing.Font("Verdana", 9.75F,
System.Drawing.FontStyle.Regular,
System.Drawing.GraphicsUnit.Point,
( (byte) ( 0 ) ));
try {
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this.Icon = Icon.ExtractAssociatedIcon("icon.bmp");
} catch ( ArgumentException ){
this.Icon = null;
}
this.Name = "FractalAattackGUI";
this.Text = "Fractal Attack v " + VERSION;
//menu objects
menu = new MainMenu();
fileMenu = new MenuItem("&File");
fileSaveFractal = new MenuItem("&Save Fractal",
new System.EventHandler(
this.fileSaveFractalMenuItem_Click),
Shortcut.CtrlS);
fileExitProgram = new MenuItem("E&xit",
new System.EventHandler(this.fileExitMenuItem_Click),
Shortcut.CtrlX);
fileMenu.MenuItems.Add(fileSaveFractal);
fileMenu.MenuItems.Add("-");
fileMenu.MenuItems.Add(fileExitProgram);
menu.MenuItems.Add(fileMenu);
aboutMenu = new MenuItem("&About");
aboutHelpMenuItem = new MenuItem("&Help", new
System.EventHandler(this.aboutHelpMenuItem_Click));
aboutInformationMenuItem = new MenuItem("&Information", new
System.EventHandler(this.aboutInformationMenuItem_Click));
aboutMenu.MenuItems.Add(aboutHelpMenuItem);
aboutMenu.MenuItems.Add(aboutInformationMenuItem);
menu.MenuItems.Add(aboutMenu);
this.Menu = menu;
//GUI objects (text boxes, drop down boxes, etc.)
status = new StatusBar();
messages = new StatusBarPanel();
messages.BorderStyle = StatusBarPanelBorderStyle.Raised;
messages.AutoSize = StatusBarPanelAutoSize.Spring;
status.Panels.Add(messages);
status.ShowPanels = true;
this.Controls.Add(status);
optionsLabel = new Label();
optionsLabel.Text = "Options:";
optionsLabel.SetBounds(0, 0, 70, 20);
optionsLabel.TextAlign = ContentAlignment.TopLeft;
typeLabel = new Label();
typeLabel.Text = "Fractal Type";
typeLabel.SetBounds(75, 0, 100, 20);
typeLabel.TextAlign = ContentAlignment.TopLeft;
String[] fractals = { "<Select Fractal>", "Heighway-Dragon" };
fractalChooser = new ComboBox();
fractalChooser.DataSource = fractals;
fractalChooser.DropDownStyle = ComboBoxStyle.DropDownList;
fractalChooser.SetBounds(75, 20, 150, 30);
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iterationsLabel = new Label();
iterationsLabel.Text = "Iterations";
iterationsLabel.SetBounds(240, 0, 75, 20);
iterationsLabel.TextAlign = ContentAlignment.TopLeft;
iterations = new TextBox();
iterations.SetBounds(240, 20, 75, 30);
iterations.Multiline = false;
iterations.ReadOnly = false;
iterations.TextChanged += new
System.EventHandler(this.iterationsTextBox_TextChanged);
orientationLabel = new Label();
orientationLabel.Text = "Orientation";
orientationLabel.SetBounds(325, 0, 100, 20);
orientationLabel.TextAlign = ContentAlignment.TopLeft;
orientationChooser = new ComboBox();
String[] orienationChoices = { "<Direction>", "Pi/2 (Up)",
"2Pi (Right)", "3pi/4 (Down)" ,
"Pi (Left)" };
orientationChooser.DataSource = orienationChoices;
orientationChooser.SetBounds(325, 20, 100, 20);
orientationChooser.DropDownStyle = ComboBoxStyle.DropDownList;
generateFractalButton = new Button();
generateFractalButton.SetBounds(440, 12, 80, 25);
generateFractalButton.Text = "Generate";
generateFractalButton.Click += new
System.EventHandler(this.generateFractalButton_Click);
optionsPanel = new Panel();
optionsPanel.SetBounds(5, 5, 531, 50);
optionsPanel.BorderStyle = BorderStyle.Fixed3D;
optionsPanel.Controls.Add(optionsLabel);
optionsPanel.Controls.Add(fractalChooser);
optionsPanel.Controls.Add(typeLabel);
optionsPanel.Controls.Add(iterationsLabel);
optionsPanel.Controls.Add(iterations);
optionsPanel.Controls.Add(orientationLabel);
optionsPanel.Controls.Add(orientationChooser);
optionsPanel.Controls.Add(generateFractalButton);
this.Controls.Add(optionsPanel);
displayPanel = new Panel();
progressDisplay = new ContinuousProgressBar();
progressDisplay.SetBounds(65, 151, 400, 30);
progressDisplay.Visible = false;
progressDisplay.Value = 0;
displayPanel.Controls.Add(progressDisplay);
progressBarLabel = new Label();
progressBarLabel.SetBounds(65, 131, 400, 20);
progressBarLabel.BackColor = Color.White;
progressBarLabel.TextAlign = ContentAlignment.TopCenter;
progressBarLabel.Visible = false;
displayPanel.Controls.Add(progressBarLabel);
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displayPanel.SetBounds(5, 60, 531, 332);
displayPanel.BorderStyle = BorderStyle.Fixed3D;
displayPanel.BackColor = Color.White;
this.Controls.Add(displayPanel);
threadedGeneration = new BackgroundWorker();
threadedGeneration.WorkerReportsProgress = true;
threadedGeneration.WorkerSupportsCancellation = false;
threadedGeneration.ProgressChanged += new
ProgressChangedEventHandler(
threadedGeneration_ProgressChanged);
threadedGeneration.DoWork += new
DoWorkEventHandler(threadedGeneration_DoWork);
this.ResumeLayout(false);
}
//message utility function for status bar update
private void displayMessage( String message ) {
if ( message != null ) {
messages.Text = message;
}
}
//menu listener for the “Save” command
private void fileSaveFractalMenuItem_Click( Object sender,
EventArgs e ) {
if ( fractalGenerated ) {
int fileNumber = 0;
System.IO.Directory.SetCurrentDirectory(CURRENT_DIRECTORY);
for ( int i = 0; i < System.IO.Directory.GetFiles(
CURRENT_DIRECTORY).Length; i++ ) {
if ( System.IO.File.Exists( BITMAP_NAME + fileNumber +
BITMAP_EXTENSION ) ) {
fileNumber++;
}
}
displayPanel.BackgroundImage.Save(CURRENT_DIRECTORY +
BITMAP_NAME +
fileNumber +
BITMAP_EXTENSION,
System.Drawing.Imaging.ImageFormat.Bmp);
displayMessage("Fractal saved as " + BITMAP_NAME +
fileNumber + BITMAP_EXTENSION);
} else {
displayMessage("No fractal has been generated, no file will
be saved.");
}
}
//menu “Exit” option action
private void fileExitMenuItem_Click( Object sender,
EventArgs e ) {
fractalGenerated = false;
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Application.Exit();
}
//menu “Help” option action
private void aboutHelpMenuItem_Click( Object sender,
EventArgs e ) {
MessageBox.Show(this, "If you need help figuring out how to
operate this application, you need more
help that I can offer.",
"Fractal Attack Help", MessageBoxButtons.OK,
MessageBoxIcon.Question);
}
//menu “Info” option action
private void aboutInformationMenuItem_Click( Object sender,
EventArgs e ) {
MessageBox.Show(this, "Fractal Attack v " + VERSION + "\nThe
Premier .NET Fractal Generation
Application\nDeveloped by AFRL/RYTA
ATSPI Office\n\nDevelopers\nMatt
Zimmerman",
"Fractal Attack Information",
MessageBoxButtons.OK,
MessageBoxIcon.Information);
}
//listener action to do validation of the number of iterations
private void iterationsTextBox_TextChanged( Object sender,
EventArgs e ) {
long value = 0;
if ( !Int64.TryParse(iterations.Text, out value) ||
iterations.Text.Contains(".")){
iterations.Text = "";
displayMessage("Please enter an integer value for
iterations.");
}
}
//reversing target function, uses arbitrary computations to
//determine a starting location
public static int computeOrientation( int orientation,
int numIterations,
int type ){
long temp = System.DateTime.Now.Ticks; //current system time
int key1 = 0;
int key2 = 0;
int result = 0;
key1 = (int)(temp * orientation );
key2 = (int)(temp / numIterations );
result = Math.Abs(( key1 + key2 ) % 4 + 1); //absolute value
if ( result < 1 )
result = 1;
if ( result > 4 )
result = 4;
if ( orientation == 1 )
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return 1; // pi/2 input will ALWAYS be up
return result;
}
//top level method to control fractal generation and display
private void displayHeighwayDragon( int startOrientation,
long iterations) {
//method variables
int orientation = startOrientation;
int right = 0;
int left = 0;
int up = 0;
int down = 0;
int max_right = 0;
int max_left = 0;
int max_up = 0;
int max_down = 0;
int startRow, startColumn, previousColumn, previousRow;
//setup the render to start displaying
generationInProgress = true;
fractal_progress = 0;
fractal_stage = CALCULATE_FOLDS;
threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress);
//construct the string that contains the sequence of turns
string sequence = "";
string temp = "";
for ( int i = 0; i < iterations; i++ ) {
fractal_progress = (int) ( ( (double) i / iterations )
* 100 );
threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress);
//flip the previous sequence
temp = "";
for ( int j = sequence.Length - 1; j >= 0; j-- ){
if ( sequence[j].CompareTo(RIGHT) == 0 ) {
temp += LEFT;
} else {
temp += RIGHT;
}
}
//add "R" to the sequence and append the flipped
//previous sequence
sequence += RIGHT;
sequence += temp;
}
//update the progress display
fractal_progress = 100;
threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress);
System.Threading.Thread.Sleep(1000);
//switch to bitmap generation
fractal_stage = GENERATE_BITMAP;
fractal_progress = 0;
threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress);
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//determine the limits of the fractal curve
for ( int i = 0; i < sequence.Length; i++ ){
fractal_progress = (int) ( ( (double) i /
sequence.Length ) * 100 );
threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress);
calculateNextHeighwayDragonLine(sequence, i, ref
orientation,
ref up, ref down, ref
right, ref left);
//adjust maximum observed values if necessary
if ( down > max_down ) max_down = down;
if ( up > max_up ) max_up = up;
if ( right > max_right ) max_right = right;
if ( left > max_left ) max_left = left;
}
//additional variables
int height = 0;
int width = 0;
int[][] fractal = null;
//find bounding values for fractal size calculation
height = max_up + max_down + 1;
width = max_left + max_right + 1;
fractal = new int[height * SCALING][];
for ( int i = 0; i < height * SCALING; i++ ) {
fractal[i] = new int[width * SCALING];
for ( int j = 0; j < width * SCALING; j++ ) {
fractal[i][j] = EMPTY_SPACE;
}
}
//save position values of the starting point
startRow
= max_up;
startColumn = max_left;
up = down = left = right = 0;
orientation = startOrientation;
//draw the fractal curve one line at a time
//the drawLine method will update the fractal 2d array
int previousOrientation;
if ( orientation == NORTH || orientation == SOUTH ) {
drawLine(ref fractal, startRow, startColumn,
VERTICAL);
previousOrientation = VERTICAL;
}
else {
drawLine(ref fractal, startRow, startColumn,
HORIZONTAL);
previousOrientation = HORIZONTAL;
}
previousColumn = startColumn;
previousRow = startRow;
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int previousProgress = fractal_progress;
for ( int i = 0; i < sequence.Length; i++ ) {
fractal_progress = (int) ( ((double) i /
sequence.Length ) * 100 );
if ( fractal_progress != previousProgress ){
threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(
fractal_progress);
previousProgress = fractal_progress;
}
calculateNextHeighwayDragonLine(sequence, i, ref
orientation,
ref up, ref down,
ref right,
ref left);
if ( orientation == NORTH ||
orientation == SOUTH ) {
drawLine(ref fractal, startRow + down - up,
startColumn + right - left, VERTICAL);
drawCorner(ref fractal, previousOrientation,
previousRow, previousColumn,
VERTICAL, startRow + down - up,
startColumn + right - left);
previousOrientation = VERTICAL;
} else if ( orientation == EAST ||
orientation == WEST ) {
drawLine(ref fractal, startRow + down - up,
startColumn + right - left,
HORIZONTAL);
drawCorner(ref fractal, previousOrientation,
previousRow, previousColumn,
HORIZONTAL, startRow + down - up,
startColumn + right - left);
previousOrientation = HORIZONTAL;
}
previousColumn = startColumn + right - left;
previousRow = startRow + down - up;
}
//update progress bar
fractal_progress = 100;
threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress);
System.Threading.Thread.Sleep(1000);
fractal_stage = RENDER_FRACTAL;
fractal_progress = 0;
threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress);
//display the fractal by populating a bitmap with
//the appropriate pixel array data
System.Drawing.Bitmap picture = null;
if ( fractal.Length > 0 ) {
picture = new System.Drawing.Bitmap(
fractal[0].Length,
fractal.Length);
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for ( int i = 0; i < picture.Height; i++ ) {
fractal_progress = (int) ( ( (double) i /
fractal.Length ) * 100 );
if ( fractal_progress !=
progressDisplay.Value ) {
threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(
fractal_progress);
}
for ( int j = 0; j < picture.Width; j++ ) {
if ( fractal[i][j] == LINE ) {
picture.SetPixel(j, i,
System.Drawing.Color.RoyalBlue);
} else if ( fractal[i][j] == EMPTY_SPACE ) {
picture.SetPixel(j, i,
System.Drawing.Color.White);
} else if ( fractal[i][j] == GRADIENT ) {
picture.SetPixel(j, i,
System.Drawing.Color.PowderBlue);
}
}
}
}
//setup the render to start displaying
fractal_picture = picture;
generationInProgress = false;
fractal_progress = 100;
threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress);
System.Threading.Thread.Sleep(1000);
}

//draw a corner between two lines (purely for visual appeal)
private static void drawCorner( ref int[][] fractal,
int previousOrientation,
int previousRow,
int previousColumn,
int orientation, int row,
int column ) {
//corner north-east
if ( previousOrientation == VERTICAL &&
previousColumn < column && previousRow > row ) {
fractal[previousRow * 3 - 1][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 - 2][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 - 2][previousColumn * 3 + 2] =
LINE;
//fill the other cells with gradient shading
for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) {
for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) {
if ( fractal[( previousRow - 1 ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) {
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fractal[( previousRow - 1 ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT;
}
}
}
}
//corner south-east
else if ( previousOrientation == VERTICAL &&
previousColumn < column && previousRow < row ) {
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 3][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 4][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 4][previousColumn * 3 + 2] =
LINE;
//fill the other cells with gradient shading
for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) {
for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) {
if ( fractal[( previousRow + 1 ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn ) * 3 + j] != LINE )
{
fractal[( previousRow + 1 ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT;
}
}
}
}
//corner south-west
else if ( previousOrientation == VERTICAL &&
previousColumn > column && previousRow
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 3][previousColumn *
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 4][previousColumn *
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 4][previousColumn *

< row ) {
3 + 1] =
3 + 1] =
3] = LINE;

//fill the other cells with gradient shading
for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) {
for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) {
if ( fractal[( previousRow + 1 ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) {
fractal[( previousRow + 1 ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT;
}
}
}
}
//corner north-west
else if ( previousOrientation == VERTICAL &&
previousColumn > column && previousRow > row ) {
fractal[previousRow * 3 - 1][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 - 2][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =

57

LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 - 2][previousColumn * 3] = LINE;
//fill the other cells with gradient shading
for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) {
for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) {
if ( fractal[( previousRow - 1 ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) {
fractal[( previousRow - 1 ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT;
}
}
}
}
//corner east-north
else if ( previousOrientation == HORIZONTAL &&
previousColumn < column && previousRow > row ) {
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 + 3] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 + 4] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3][previousColumn * 3 + 4] = LINE;
//fill the other cells with gradient shading
for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) {
for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) {
if ( fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn + 1 ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) {
fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn + 1 ) * 3 + j] =
GRADIENT;
}
}
}
}
//corner east-south
else if ( previousOrientation == HORIZONTAL &&
previousColumn < column && previousRow < row ) {
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 + 3] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 + 4] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 2][previousColumn * 3 + 4] =
LINE;
//fill the other cells with gradient shading
for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) {
for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) {
if ( fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn + 1 ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) {
fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn + 1 ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT;
}
}
}
}
//corner west-north
else if ( previousOrientation == HORIZONTAL &&
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previousColumn > column && previousRow > row ) {
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 - 1] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 - 2] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3][previousColumn * 3 - 2] = LINE;
//fill the other cells with gradient shading
for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) {
for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) {
if ( fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn - 1 ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) {
fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn - 1 ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT;
}
}
}
}
//corner west-south
else if ( previousOrientation == HORIZONTAL &&
previousColumn > column && previousRow < row ) {
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 - 1] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 - 2] =
LINE;
fractal[previousRow * 3 + 2][previousColumn * 3 - 2] =
LINE;
//fill the other cells with gradient shading
for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) {
for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) {
if ( fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn - 1 ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) {
fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(
previousColumn - 1 ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT;
}
}
}
}
}
//draw a standard line in the fractal bitmap space
private static void drawLine( ref int[][] fractal, int row,
int column, int orientation ) {
if ( orientation == HORIZONTAL ) {
for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) {
fractal[row * 3 + 1][column * 3 + i] = LINE;
if ( fractal[row * 3][column * 3 + i] != LINE ) {
fractal[row * 3][column * 3 + i] = GRADIENT;
}
if ( fractal[row * 3 + 2][column * 3 + i] != LINE ) {
fractal[row * 3 + 2][column * 3 + i] = GRADIENT;
}
}
} else {
for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) {
fractal[row * 3 + i][column * 3 + 1] = LINE;
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if ( fractal[row
fractal[row *
}
if ( fractal[row
fractal[row *
}

* 3 + i][column * 3] != LINE ) {
3 + i][column * 3] = GRADIENT;
* 3 + i][column * 3 + 2] != LINE ) {
3 + i][column * 3 + 2] = GRADIENT;

}
}
}
//calculate which way the next line segment will be drawn in an
//HD fractal
static void calculateNextHeighwayDragonLine( string sequence,
int i,
ref int
orientation,
ref int u,
ref int d,
ref int r,
ref int l ) {
if ( sequence[i].CompareTo(RIGHT) == 0 ) {
switch ( orientation ) {
case NORTH:
if ( d > 0 ) d--;
else u++;
if ( l > 0 ) l--;
else r++;
orientation = EAST;
break;
case SOUTH:
if ( r > 0 ) r--;
else l++;
if ( u > 0 ) u--;
else d++;
orientation = WEST;
break;
case EAST:
if ( u > 0 ) u--;
else d++;
if ( l > 0 ) l--;
else r++;
orientation = SOUTH;
break;
case WEST:
if ( r > 0 ) r--;
else l++;
if ( d > 0 ) d--;
else u++;
orientation = NORTH;
break;
}
} else if ( sequence[i].CompareTo(LEFT) == 0 ) {
switch ( orientation ) {
case NORTH:
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if ( d > 0 ) d--;
else u++;
if ( r > 0 ) r--;
else l++;
orientation = WEST;
break;
case SOUTH:
if ( l > 0 ) l--;
else r++;
if ( u > 0 ) u--;
else d++;
orientation = EAST;
break;
case EAST:
if ( l > 0 ) l--;
else r++;
if ( d > 0 ) d--;
else u++;
orientation = NORTH;
break;
case WEST:
if ( u > 0 ) u--;
else d++;
if ( r > 0 ) r--;
else l++;
orientation = SOUTH;
break;
}
}
}
//handle progress updates and display on the progress bar
private void threadedGeneration_ProgressChanged( Object sender,
EventArgs e ) {
switch ( fractal_stage ) {
case CALCULATE_FOLDS:
progressBarLabel.Text = "Step 1 / 3 Compute Fractal";
break;
case GENERATE_BITMAP:
progressBarLabel.Text = "Step 2 / 3 Generate Image";
break;
case RENDER_FRACTAL:
progressBarLabel.Text = "Step 3 / 3 Render Fractal";
break;
}
progressBarLabel.Text += " " + fractal_progress + "%
Completed";
progressDisplay.Value = fractal_progress;
if ( fractal_progress == 0 ) {
progressBarLabel.Visible = true;
progressDisplay.Visible = true;
} else if ( fractal_progress == 100 &&
fractal_stage == RENDER_FRACTAL) {
progressBarLabel.Visible = false;
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progressDisplay.Visible = false;
if ( fractal_iterations > GUI_MAX_ITERATIONS_CENTERED ) {
displayPanel.BackgroundImageLayout = ImageLayout.Zoom;
} else {
displayPanel.BackgroundImageLayout = ImageLayout.Center;
}
displayPanel.BackgroundImage = fractal_picture;
displayMessage("Fractal generated.");
fractalGenerated = true;
}
}
//thread invocation that executes the top-level draw method
private void threadedGeneration_DoWork( Object sender,
EventArgs e ) {
displayHeighwayDragon(fractal_orientation,
fractal_iterations);
}

//button click listen to initiate fractal generation
private void generateFractalButton_Click( Object sender,
EventArgs e ) {
int type = 0;
int orientation = 0;
long numIterations = 0;
switch ( fractalChooser.SelectedIndex ) {
case INVALID:
displayMessage("Please select a fractal to generate.");
return;
case HEIGHWAY_DRAGON:
type = fractalChooser.SelectedIndex;
break;
default:
displayMessage("Please select a fractal to generate.");
return;
}
if ( !Int64.TryParse(iterations.Text, out numIterations) ||
iterations.Text.Contains(".") || numIterations < 0 ) {
displayMessage("Please enter a positive integer value for
iterations.");
return;
}
switch ( orientationChooser.SelectedIndex ) {
case INVALID:
displayMessage("Please select an orientation for the
fractal.");
return;
case NORTH:
case EAST:
case SOUTH:
case WEST:
orientation = orientationChooser.SelectedIndex;
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break;
default:
displayMessage("Please select an orientation for the
fractal.");
return;
}
if ( numIterations > HEIGHWAY_DRAGON_LARGE_WARNING ) {
if ( ( MessageBox.Show("Heighway-Dragon fractals of greater
than degree " +
HEIGHWAY_DRAGON_LARGE_WARNING +
" may take a great deal of time to
compute. Continue?", "Generate
Large Fractal?",
MessageBoxButtons.YesNo,
MessageBoxIcon.Warning) )
.Equals(DialogResult.No) ) {
displayMessage("Fractal generation aborted.");
return;
}
}
if ( numIterations > HEIGHWAY_DRAGON_HUGE_WARNING ) {
if ( ( MessageBox.Show("Honestly, you will probably be dead
before this fractal completes
rendering. REALLY Continue?",
"Generate Ridiculously-Large
Fractal?", MessageBoxButtons.YesNo,
MessageBoxIcon.Warning) )
.Equals(DialogResult.No) ) {
displayMessage("Fractal generation aborted.");
return;
}
}
displayMessage("Generating fractal...");
switch ( type ){
case HEIGHWAY_DRAGON:
if ( generationInProgress ) {
displayMessage("Fractal generation already in
progress.");
return;
}
progressBarLabel.Visible = true;
progressDisplay.Visible = true;
fractal_orientation = orientation;
fractal_iterations = numIterations;
fractal_type = type;
threadedGeneration.RunWorkerAsync();
break;
}
}
}
//progress bar object
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public class ContinuousProgressBar : ProgressBar {
public ContinuousProgressBar() {
this.Style = ProgressBarStyle.Continuous;
this.ForeColor = Color.SteelBlue;
this.BackColor = Color.WhiteSmoke;
}
protected override void CreateHandle() {
base.CreateHandle();
try { SetWindowTheme(this.Handle, "", ""); }
catch { }
}
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.DllImport("uxtheme.dll")]
private static extern int SetWindowTheme(IntPtr hwnd, string
appname, string idlist);
}
}
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